VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN ALUMINUM: A BAR TO  EFFECTIVE COMPETITION by unknown
VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN ALUMINUM: A BAR
TO "EFFECTIVE COMPETITION"
THE Alcoa I and American Tobacco 2 decisions in the midforties sounded
the bell for a new round in the fight against monopoly power.3 Power to
control price and exclude competitors, whether held by one firm or several
firms in combination, 4 became the crux of the offense of monopolizing under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The power alone-apart from its exercise-
was condemned. And judicial definition of monopolization, emphasizing the
existence of market power rather than the means by which it was acquired,5
at last began to jibe with the views of economists.
6
But these doctrinal advances have produced new remedial problems.
7
Where in the past specific illegalities could be directly struck down, cracking
1. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); see Note,
54 YALE L.J. 860 (1945).
2. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
3. For analysis of the role these cases play in the growth of antitrust doctrine and the
new possibilities for action under the Sherman Act which they portend, see two articles by
Rostow: The New Sherman Act; A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. OF Cm. L. REv.
567 (1947); Mfonopoly Under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose?, 43 ILL. 745, 761-778
(1949). See also Levi, The Antitrust Laws and Monopoly, 14 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 154, 174-
183 (1947). But cf. Johnston & Stevens, Monopoly or Monopolization-A Reply to Prof.
Rostow, 44 ILL. L. REV. 269, 284-287 (1949) for a narrower view of the "new" Sherman
Act's potentialities.
4. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946); United States
v. Patten, 187 Fed. 664, 672 (S.D. N.Y. 1911). The Tobacco case involved a fairly clear case
of conspiracy between the firms controlling the market. For this reason the decision left
unanswered the question of how much evidence is necessary to prove combination in a Sec-
tion 2 case. See Rostow, Monopoly Under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose? 43 ILL. L.
REv. 745, 781 (1949). Cf. Johnston & Stevens, Monopoly or Monopolization-A Reply to
Prof. Rostow, 44 ILL. L. REV. 269, 283-6 (1949).
5. Only if such power is "thrust upon" a defendant is its possession not violative of the
Sherman Act, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
Cf. United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 226 Fed. 62, 79 (W.D. N.Y. 1915) (normality
of growth named as the test of Sherman Act violation).
6. The growing similarity between definitions of monopoly applied by judges and by
economists is analyzed in Mason, The Current Status of the Monopoly Problem in the United
States, 62 HARv. L. REv. 1265 (1949). Cf. Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics, 47
YALE L.J. 34 (1937).
7. See Levi, supra note 3, at 182: "But if the Sherman Act is to be made effective . . .
something must be done about the relief secured from the courts." As to just what that
"something" should be, opinions vary. Some authors press for increased appropriations for
research in the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. See HAmILuON & TILL,
ANTITRUST IN AcTioN 23-6 (TNEC Monograph 16, 1940); Arnold, Antitrust Law, Past
and Future, 7 LAW AND CONTEBP. PROB. 5, 9-10 (1940). Others favor taking the burden off
both the courts and the Antitrust Division by expanding the Federal Trade Commission.
The FTC could then make comprehensive industry-wide studies and concoct the remedies
to be recommended by the government. See Comment, British Monopolies Act of 1948:
A Contrast with American Policy and Practice, 59 YALE L.J. 899, 926 (1950). For analysis
of a specific legislative proposal aimed at more effective enforcement, see testimony of
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market control and establishing effective competition now requires tamper-
ing with basic industry patterns. Though court action of varying degrees of
finality has now been taken in all five of the "new" Sherman Act cases,
5
it is not yet possible to evaluate the full impact of the new doctrine. But
such hindsight is not required for appraisal of the 1950 Alcoa divestiture
decision.9 For the court's failure to disturb the industrial structure in alu-
minum makes thwarting of "new" Sherman Act goals almost inevitable.
The 1950 Alcoa case came as a sequel to the 1945 decision,1" in which
Alcoa's 90% share of domestic virgin ingot production was held to be a
monopoly." In 1945 the Second Circuit chose to take no remedial action,
preferring to wait till it could ascertain the effect on competition of Govern-
ment disposal of its war-built aluminum plants. 12 Subsequent sale of these
plants to Reynolds and Kaiser 13 revolutionized the industry, leaving Alcoa
with control of only 50 % of ingot capacity. 14 On the strength of this develop-
Walton Hamilton, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power of the House
Committee on the .Tudiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 285-289 (1950).
But numerous aberrations must not obscure the substantial impact, direct and in-
direct, of administrative and judicial action under the antitrust laws. For an appraisal of
their effect and a comparison with the British experience, see Comment, The British Mo-
nopolies Act of 1948: A Contrast with American Policy and Practice, 59 YALE L.J. 899, 921
(1950).
8. The five major "new" Sherman Act cases are listed in note 16 infra. In the Griffith
case, a recent District Court opinion refused divestiture, but granted an injunction pro-
hibiting defendants from licensing films for their open and closed towns in single contracts.
United States v. Griffith Amusement Co., No. 172-Civil (W.D. Okla., December 1950). It
is not clear how great an effect this will have on the chain's bargaining position. See also
United States v. Griffith Amusement Co., CCH TRADE REP. '48-'51, 62,582 (D. Okla.
1950) (denying a Government motion to join the lessee of certain theatres as party de-
fendant). The American Tobacco case was a criminal case, and resulted in fines totalling
$255,000. The Schine case has been concluded by a consent decree, ordering disposition of
some forty theatres, and enjoining certain practices. United States v. Schine Chain Theatres,
Inc., CCH TRADE CASES 62,447 (W.D. N.Y. 1949). For the Alcoa case, see text infra.
The most striking remedial action taken, however, is the divestiture decree in the
Paramount case. 85 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. N.Y. 1949). For a competent analysis of the ad-
ditional steps necessary to insure continuing competition in the motion picture industry,
see McDonough & Winslow, The Motion Picture Industry: United States v. Oligopoly. I
STAN. L. REv. 385 (1949).
9. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333 (S.D. N.Y. 1950).
10. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
11. Id. at 425; but note that what at first glance might appear to be a percentage test
was preceded by a detailed market analysis in regard to the inclusion of "secondary alum-
inum."
12. Id. at 446-7. For the antitrust goals that were to guide surplus property disposal,
see Sec.-2 of the SURPLus PROPERTY AcT, 58 STAT. 765 (1944), 50 U.S.C. APP. §§ 1611, 1627,
1629 (Supp. 1945).
13. For description of this disposal process, see STEIN, THE DISPOSAL OF THE ALUbi-
INtmi PLANTS (Corrimittee on Public Administration Cases, 1948); REPORT OF THE SURPLUS
PROPERTY BOARD TO THE CONGRESS (Sept. 21, 1945).
14. The 1950 court chose percentage of primary aluminum production as the yardstick
of market control. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333, 363 (S.D.
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ment, Alcoa petitioned the District Court for a declaration that it no longer
,constituted a monopoly. The Government countered with a divestiture
plan aimed at splitting Alcoa into two integrated competitors,'5 and the
issue was joined.
Because the structure of the aluminum industry had been so radically
changed since the 2nd Circuits' 1945 decision, the District Court was faced
with a troublesome doctrinal dilemma. It was by no means clear that even
the broadest version of the "new" test would hold Alcoa to be presently in
violation of Section 2.16 But the District Court's narrow view of that test
N.Y. 1950). The Government, in its brief at p. 98, claimed "that the production yardstick
is susceptible to manipulation, and is not a reliable measure of market control in this in-
dustry." To back up this contention, it cited the testimony of Mr. Wilson, a Vice-President
of Alcoa, Transcript of Record, p. 974, to the effect that Alcoa had to keep on its toes to
keep from producing more than 50% of primary aluminum. The Gover iment Brief further
suggested that "The most meaningful measure of market control in this industry is metal
controlled, i.e., the primary aluminum produced and acquired by Alcoa, Reynolds and
Kaiser . . . for it reflects the full potential of each producer to penetrate the market."
Brief at 98. The metal-controlled test would boost Alcoa's share up to an average of 57.4%
for the three and three-quarter year period involved. See id. table 7.
15. In November 1948, before submitting its divestiture plan, the United States sought
a writ of mandamus directing the district court to strike from Article XII of the 1945 judg-
ment "a clause which gives leave to 'Alcoa' to apply to the district court 'for a determination
of the question whether or not it still has a monopoly in the ingot market.' " United States
v. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 171 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1948). In
denying the Government's petition the Second Circuit emphasized that "[dlissolution . . .
will not depend on the single question whether 'Alcoa' at the time of the judgment shall
have a monopoly of the ingot market. On the contrary, it will depend upon what is 'Alcoa's'
position in the industry at that time." Id. at 286.
The Government's divestiture plan, set out in the Supplement to the Brief of the
United States at 5-16, involved setting up a competitor with both production and fabrica-
tion facilities. The new competitor would produce about 10% of primary aluminum at
costs comparable to Alcoa's.
16. The principal cases under the "new" Sherman Act are United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); Schine Chain Theatres v. United States, 334 U.S. 110
(1948); United States v. Griffith Amusement Co., 334 U.S. 100 (1948); American Tobacco
Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); and United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). These cases constitute a striking departure from earlier cases,
typified by United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920), which em-
phasized the methods by which market power was utilized rather than the existence of the
power. Under their broadest interpretation, the new cases stand for the proposition that
it is unlawful under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, for one firm or a combination of firms,
to acquire, in the course of making normal business decisions, sufficient market dominance
to be able "substantially to influence" the price structure in the market, or to restrict free
entry into the market. See Rostow, Monopoly under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose?,
43 ILL. L. REv. 745, 763 (1948). Even under the new test, thus interpreted, the following
considerations make it unclear whether, without substantial extension of present doctrine,
the court could have found a present Section 2 violation on the part of Alcoa.
(1). The position of Alcoa alone. This involves the two problems of whether Alcoa holds
present monopoly power, and whether it has monopolized. (a) The U.S. Steel decision,
supra, found no violation in an industrial structure closely paralleling that of the present
aluminum industry. The decision emphasized the fact that U.S. Steel's percentage share of
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removed all doubts; no present violation could have been found. The
"new" Sherman test began with percentage size based on a full analysis of
market structure, and then proceeded to analyze the power over price and
entry accompanying that size.17 Though the court did not apply any Section
the market totalled only 51%. It also emphasized recent decreases in that percentage share.
Alcoa may now have in some respects greater influence in the aluminum industry than
U.S. Steel did then in the steel industry. But, even assuming that that greater degree of
power would be uncovered by the thorough market analysis required by "new" Sherman
Act doctrine, the situations presented in the two cases are sufficiently similar that a finding
of present violation on the part of Alcoa would necessarily require effective overruling of the
Steel case. Furthermore, assuming that that could be done in view of the impact of the
"new" Sherman Act cases, it is not clear that the court could have found present domina-
tion by Alcoa sufficient to give it power substantially to influence price. The actual findings
made indicate the opposite: "In themselves, under present market conditions, [the super-
iority of Alcoa's physical resources does] not bar effective competition." 91 F. Supp. 333,
380 (S.D. N.Y. 1950). See also id. at 365 (price domination not established); id. at 392
(Alcoa's patent position not a threat to effective competition); note 26 infra. The inadequacy
of some of the court's analysis, particularly that portion dealing with the price structure,
however, and the bypassing of the problem of vertical integration, makes it unclear whether
a different court would have been forced to the same conclusions. (b) A finding that the
possessor of monopoly power has "monopolized" within the meaning of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act requires a showing that the defendant has deliberately obtained or maintained
the requisite power. Aluminum Co. of America v. United States, 148 F.2d 416, 429-32
(2d Cir. 1945). The deliberateness means nothing more than that the power must have
resulted from a course of business practice, in itself perfectly lawful, rather than happen-
stance. la the instant case, the making of such a finding would be hampered by the fact that
whatever Alcoa's business policies have been over the past five years, its percentage share
of the market decreased from 90 to 50%. Furthermore, Alcoa has been consistently under
the jurisdiction of the court for over ten years, and has been existing under the threat of
dissolution for five-factors which are not conducive to any policy directed towards either
obtaining more power, or even maintaining the degree of power already found to be a viola-
tion. For the court's discussion of these points, see 91 F.Supp. at 402-16.
(2). The industry as a whole. Whether or not Alcoa alone occupies such a dominant
position in the industry as to be itself in violation of Section 2, it seems clear that the struc-
ture of the industry as a whole precludes the entry of new competitors. See pages 301-05
infra. The court so found. 91 F. Supp. 331, 401. The power to exclude competitors con-
stitutes a Section 2 violation. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, supra. But if that
power is held by the whole industry, rather than by one firm in it alone, an essential element
in the violation is the finding of a combination or conspiracy to acquire or maintain such
power. Since no combination or conspiracy was alleged or argued in the instant case, no
evidence was presented and no findings could be made on this point. But it seems likely that
any attempt to prove combination or conspiracy would necessarily rely mainly on (a) the
mere existence of identical organization, i.e. vertical integration, on the part of Alcoa,
Reynolds, and Kaiser, and (b) evidence of parallel response by all three to market stimuli.
It is doubtful that present doctrine goes that far. Compare the fact situations in United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., supra; FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948);
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, supra. And see Clayton Mark & Co. v. FTC, 168
F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948), affirmed by equally divided court, 336 U.S. 956 (1949), discussed in
Johnson & Stevens', supra note 3, at 293-4. Cf. Rostow, supra at 781-5 (economic fact of
pooling of power enough for showing of combination).
17. See note 3 supra. See also United States v. Aluminium Co. of America, 148 F.2d
416, 430 (1945); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946).
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2 test, it apparently took a more limited view of what the test was. In-
stead of being a factor relevant to the determination of market power,
percentage share became the crux of the test; analysis of the power that
comes with size in a given market was made superfluous. For purposes of
this test, the crucial determinant would have been Alcoa's present 50%
share of domestic virgin ingot capacity.18 As Judge Knox read the un-
fortunate "30-60-90" dictum in the 1945 Alcoa case 19 and the Supreme
Court's opinion in the Columbia Steel case,2 50% would be insufficient to
constitute a violation. Thus if this court's monopoly test had been used as
a test of the need for remedy, no monopoly would have been found and no
remedial action possible.
Precluded from taking remedial action under its view of Section 2 stand-
ards, the court went on to fashion a special remedial test of its own. The
court held that even if Alcoa did not have present monopoly power, remedial
action must be taken if present market conditions did not preclude any
"reasonable expectation of the resumption of future unlawful conditions.' 21
18. Seenote 14supra.
19. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333, 345 (S.D. N.Y. 1950).
Judge Learned Hand's dictum in the 1945 Alcoa case stated that "[90 per cent] is enough to
constitute a monopoly; it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four per cent would be enough;
and certainly thirty-three per cent is not." United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
148 F.2d 416,424 (2d Cir. 1945).
Definition of monopoly in such percentage terms is sharply criticized in Mason, supra
note 6, at 1274, and McDonough & Winslow, supra note 8, at 424. The inconsistency of
reliance on percentage short-cuts with the detailed market analysis that formed the basis
of Judge Hand's opinion is commented on by Rostow in Monopoly Under the Sherman Act;
Power or Purpose?, 43 ILL. L. REv. 745, 778 (1949) "Unfortunately, (percentage) ceilings
.... are not practicable. The significance of a given absolute size differs from case to
case with variations in technology, in methods of economic organization, and in the size
and strength of those with whom the large enterprise deals.... and in the ease with which
new competition can appear." EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COmPEnTiON 120-1 (1949).
20. The court read United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948), as depend-
ing largely on the fact that United States Steel controlled no more than 51% of the rolled
steel and ingot capacity in the relevant market. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
91 F. Supp. 333,345 (S.D. N.Y. 1950.) Cf. Mason, supra note 6, at 1265; Note, The Columbia
Steel Case: New Light on Old Antitrust Problems, 58 YALE L.J. 764, 773 (1949), for a more
plausible explanation of that court's rationale in terms of the estoppel element involved
after United States Steel's purchase of the Geneva plant had been encouraged by the govern-
ment.
The 1950 court's interpretation of the Columbia Steel case, coupled with reliance on the
1945 Alcoa dictum discussed in note 19 supra, gives rise to a strong implication that it
would have considered a showing of 50% control or less an almost complete defense to a
de novo charge of monopoly.
21. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333, 346 (S.D. N.Y. 1950).
Both the Brief of the United States, at p. 13, and the remedial mandate of the Cir-
cuit Court, United States v. Southern District of New York, 171 F.2d 285, 286 (2d Cir.
1948), point out that even though Alcoa may no longer have a monopoly in the ingot market,
divestiture may still be in order. The implication was that though monopoly may have
vanished from the ingot field, it could appear in other markets. The 1950 court, misreading
these admonitions, reasoned "that competitive conditions, i.e. effective competition . ..
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When Alcoa was convicted in 1945, its intent to monopolize was presumed
from its continuing efforts to maintain a dominant market position. 22 In
1950, though the monopoly stigma might have vanished, this constructive
"intent" lingered on. Thus the court felt that something less than monopoly
power, when tainted with the presumption of lingering "intent," would still
make remedial action necessary.23 Only the present existence of "effective
competition," strong enough to insure against monopoly power being "thrust
upon" Alcoa in the foreseeable future, could save Alcoa from the judicial
knife. 24
The question, as the court saw it, was whether Alcoa's position barred
"competitive conditions" in the aluminum industry.25 The court concluded
that it wasn't quite sure. 21 On the one hand it feared that Reynolds and
Kaiser might be only hot-house competitors. On the other it felt that the
needs of national defense made it hazardous to chance disruption and that
Alcoa needed strength to compete with the other giants in the basic metal
industries. Moreover, the court thought that the staying power of the new
competitor proposed by the Government would be too speculative to pro-
mote "effective competition" in aluminum.
2
7
But judicial innovation of the "effective competition" test was not with-
out purpose; the court was quick to put its handiwork to use. Alcoa was
tied to the principal Canadian producer, Aluminium Ltd., through partial
conforming to law .. .may not exist even though the Sherman Act were not violated,
because of Alcoa's stronger market position in relation to its competitors," United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333, 340 (S.D. N.Y. 1950).
For an earlier hint at the "competitive conditions" test for remedial action, see United
States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 465-6 (1920) (dissenting opinion).
22. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,432 (1945).
23. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333, 347 (S.D. N.Y. 1950).
Cf. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920), where discarding, before
suit was brought, of the practices tending to show intent to monopolize resulted in a finding
of no violation.
Professor Eugene V. Rostow, of the Yale Law School, suggested in a recent speech that
this "something less than monopoly power" may be a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act. Speech before the New York State Bar Association, January 24, 1951, mimeographed
copy in Yale Law Library, at p. 17. The court made no clear reference to this possibility.
24. Id. at 346. The term "workable competition" first appeared in Clark, Toward a
Concept of Workable Competition, 30 Am. Ecox. REv. 241, 243 (1940). As a goal for antitrust
remedies, it was defined in terms of "a considerable number of firms selling closely related
products in the same market . . ., the absence of collusion, and a long run cost curve for
each new firm not materially higher than that for an established firm." Stigler, The Extent
and Bases of Monopoly, 32 Am. Ecox. REv. 3 (Supp. June 1942). Edwards has added as a
vital prerequisite for "workable competition"-the absence of a "dominant trader."
EDWARDS MAINTAINING COMPETITION 9-10 (1949).
25. Id. at 340.
26. "[IThe evidence in this proceeding is insufficient to give me a well founded assur-
ance that, in future years, competitive conditions of an effective and lawful nature will be
certain to prevail." Id. at 416 (Emphasis added).
27. Id. at 416.
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joint stock ownership. This relationship was deemed lawful by the 1945
court. The District Court here held that, despite present lawfulness, the
tie-up placed the companies in a position to stunt the growth of Reynolds
and Kaiser. Accordingly it ordered the joint stock owners to sell either their
Alcoa or their Aluminium stock.
28
Beyond this the court probed cautiously. Alcoa's productive capacity
emerged untouched. Provisions in license contracts requiring the licensee
to turn over to Alcoa all improvement patents he might develop were held
unenforceable as potential restraints on future competition. 2 And the court
procrastinated, retaining jurisdiction for five more years to see how Reynolds
and Kaiser fare.
To decide "whether competitive conditions prevailed"--i.e. whether the
present structure portended future effective competition-the court had
to analyze Alcoa's power in the national market. But the aluminum in-
dustry embraces many "markets." 11 Bauxite is mined and the silica re-
moved to produce alumina. Alumina is reduced to aluminum, in pig and
ingot form. Fabricators purchase pig and ingot and turn out finished alum-
inum products. Most fabrication, however, is not independently owned,
but is integrated with ingot production.3 Although one-fourth of Alcoa's
ingot production, and a substantially smaller portion of Reynolds' and
Kaiser's, is diverted to independent fabricators,3 2 each of these producers
owns fabricating capacity capable of consuming its total ingot production. 33
From these several "markets" the court was to choose one or more for
its analysis of "competitive conditions." The court noted that Alcoa,
Reynolds, and Kaiser have preempted-via integration-a "captive market"
28. Id. at 392-9,418. See Wall St. Journal, Jan. 17,1951, p.6, col. 3.
29. Id. at 410. The court held these provisions unenforceable as a "potential restraint
on the restoration of lawful competitive conditions." Cf. Transparent-Wrap Machine
Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947) (similar grantback provisions held not
illegal per se). See United Statesv. Aluminum Co. of America, 51 COL. L. REV. 238 (1951).
30. For a comprehensive study of the stages of production in the aluminum industry,
see WALLACE, MARKET CONTROL IN THE ALUMNUM INDUSTRY (1937) passim.
31. There is nowhere listed the total number of aluminum fabricating plants, integrated
or independent, in the United States. However, the relative significance of the independents
can be gauged by the number of tons of ingot they fabricate. In 1948, Alcoa, which supplied
86% of the ingot consumed by the non-integrated fabricators, sold 185,650,000 lbs. to the
independents. That means that the total amount of ingot fabricated by the independents
was about 218,411,000 lbs. In the same year, the total amount of primary ingot produced
was 1,291,911,000 lbs. Thus less than 17Y2% of ingot produced was fabricated by in-
dependents. That, in turn, means that 82Y2 % of all sales outlets for ingot were preempted
via integration. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333, 360 and
Table III (S.D. N.Y. 1950). Substantially the same conclusion can be drawn from exam-
ination of comparable statistics for the first nine months of 1949.
32. This diversion of ingot, in 1948, cost Alcoa an estimated $5,000,000 in profits.
Id. at 356.
33. Id. at 356, 372. But note the difference in the diversification of the fabricating
facilities of the three producers and the effect of such diversification on the comparative
ability of each to prosper in hard times. Id. at 372, 374, 385. See note 56 infra.
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for ingot, a market consisting of 82% of total ingot sales. 34 Thus whatever
competition exists is found in the market for fabricated products, not in
sales of ingot.35 But little evidence was submitted on "competitive con-
ditions" in the fabricated market. So, assuming the necessity for integration,
the court generalized: in essence it considered all "markets" as one. 36 All
aluminum products, pig or ingot, fabricated or semi-fabricated, whether
sold to independent or integrated fabricators, jobbers or ultimate consumers,
were rolled into one "market" for the court's purposes.
Never questioned by either the court or the Government was the major
premise of this market analysis-the necessity for integration of producers
and fabricators. By ignoring the problem of integration, the court left
unaltered an industrial structure which-if Reynolds and Kaiser survive--
resembles the pattern of domination just condemned in the Paramount
case.37 It overlooked the fact that integration of producers and fabricators
blocks entrance into both markets.3 s
A new ingot producer would probably have to build his own fabrication
plants. For so long as the integrated fabricators continue to operate at 50%
capacity, a newcomer faces a market for ingot which is over 82% closed to
him.39 Even without the added hurdle of a restricted market, entrance
34. Id. at 356. See note 31 supra.
35. The court recognized this fact. Id. at 356.
36. Id. at 357.
37. United States v. Paramount Pictures Inc., 85 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. N.Y. 1949). The
Paramount case does not go so far as to declare this type of industrial structure illegal per
se. The undesirable economic effects of the structure of the movie industry were greatly
enhanced by the vertical and horizontal conspiracies found by the court. United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); cf. United States v. Columbia Steel Corp.,
334 U.S. 495 (1948). But the industrial structure alone would have had a similar effect in
hampering the entry into the industry of independent producers, since large sectors of the
exhibition outlets would have been closed to them. See Rostow, The New Sherman Act,
A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. OF CHr. L. REv. 567, 569 (1947); McDonough &
Winslow, supra note 8.
See also the market analysis in United States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324 (1912).
There, control over rail transportation was utilized to control the market price for coal,
and to exclude competitors from both the coal production and rail transport markets. Sim-
ilarly examine United States v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383
(1912), and Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 77 (1911).
38. For analysis of the effect of vertical integration on the exclusion of new entrants,
see Hale, Vertical Integration: Impact of thw Antitrust Laws Upon Combinations of Suc-
cessive Stages of Production and Distribution, 49 COL. L. REv. 921, 947-8 (1949); Adelman,
Effective Competition and The Antitrust Laws, 61 HAuv. L. Rnv. 1289, 1312 (1948); Frank,
The Significance of Industrial Integration, 33 J. POL. EcoN. 179 (1925).
39. "Each of the three integrated producers has fabrication facilities with a capacity
that is at least double that of their reduction establishments." United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333, 372 (S.D. N.Y. 1950). And see note 31 supra.
No completely adequate explanation of the phenomenon of twice as much fabrication
as ingot capacity is to be found in either the record or decision. It may well be due to the
1951]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
into ingot production is no easy matter. Ready access to bauxite " and
cheap electric power 4' as well as a large supply of risk capital 42 are all
necessary. Thus requiring an ingot producer to raise twice as much capital
fact that excess diversified fabrication facilities enable an ingot producer to insure an outlet
for ingot in times of price decline by shifting production to more stable lines. However, this
does not necessarily mean that more ingot could be consumed, since the idle fabrication may
be either wholly or partly in the later of successive stages of fabrication.
40. The problem a new competitor would face in securing bauxite is detailed in REPORT
OF THE SnRLUS PROPERTY BOARD TO CONGmSS 31 (Sept. 21, 1945). There is also a sug-
gestion as to how the Government might aid potential competitors by securing foreign
bauxite supplies. Government aid in the form of a $12,000,000 ECA loan to Great Britain
for the development of Jamaican bauxite has already provided Reynolds with an independ-
ent source. Transcript of Record 160-2. Kaiser, on the other hand, is largely dependent on
Alcoa for bauxite, Government Brief at 149-150. For a discussion of the possibility of de-
velopment of substitutes, as well as an analysis of world bauxite supplies, see REPORT No. 14,
WAR CHANGES IN INDUSTRY SERIES: ALUINums 42-4, 51, 56 (prepared by the United States
Tariff Commission 1946).
41. "Roughly ten kilowatt hours of electricity . . . are required to produce one pound
of aluminum." United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333, 348 (S.D. N.Y.
1950). A suggested modification of federal power contracts aimed at fostering new compe-
tition is set forth in REPORT No. 14, op. cit. supra note 40 at 91. Such flexible power arrange-
ments would result in lower electric costs per unit of output. For analysis of their effects, see
REPORT OF THE SURPLUS PROPERTY BOARD TO CONGRESS 38 (Sept. 21, 1945).
42. The capital problem can be illustrated by estimating, on the basis of the original
cost of government war-time facilities as set forth in Table No.d, United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 91 F.Supp. 333, 351 (S.D. N.Y. 1950), how much capital would be necessary
to set up a hypothetical integrated competitor about half the size of Kaiser. In 1948, Kaiser
produced 256,289,000 lbs. of ingot, which was 20.6% of all ingot produced in the United
States. Id. at 360. The hypothetical integrated competitor, producing 10% of all ingot, or
124,392,000 lbs. annually, would need refining, reduction, and fabrication facilities:
The investment per lb. of alumina refining capacity, at the smallest war-time alumina
plant, was 2.7c. Two lbs. of alumina are necessary to produce one lb. of aluminum ingot,
so that 248,784,000 lbs. of refining capacity costing approximately $6,717,168.00 would be
required for refining investment.
Investment per lb. of reduction capacity at the Jones Mill, Arkansas, reduction plant,
about the same size as the hypothetical producer, was 24.5c. Thus with a projected ingot
capacity of 124,392,000 lbs., about $30,380,040.00 would be invested in reduction plants.
The more widely diversified the fabrication facilities owned by the new competitor,
the better his chances of success. See note 33 supra and note 56 infra. But let us assume
initial construction of only sheet and extrusion plant. The investment per lb. of capacity at
the Spokane sheet plant was 16.4c; and in the Grand Rapids extrusion plant, 6.7c. The
experience of the industry has shown that a successful competitor would need twice as much
fabrication as production capacity. Supplement to the Government's Brief 14. Assuming
that the fabrication capacity of the hypothetical competitor is to be evenly divided between
sheet and extrusion facilities, at least $28,734,552 would have to be invested in fabrication
plants.
Thus the hypothetical integrated competitor would need approximately $65,831,760
of initial investment capital, almost half of which would go to build fabrication plants.
The experience of the Southern Aluminum Co. at the outbreak of World War I in trying
to raise the $7,500,000 needed to complete an aluminum plant, illustrates the financial prob-
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to build fabrication as well as ingot plants 41 is a serious stumbling block
in the path of new competitors.
Similarly a new fabricator would be at a severe competitive disadvantage
without his own ingot production. 4 4 He must depend on either domestic
integrated producers or foreign suppliers for ingot. The principal foreign
source is the substantial production of Aluminium Limited of Canada. 45
But the competitive effectiveness of even an unshackled Aluminium is
likely to be limited by tariff vagaries, 4 Aluminium's total dependence on
foreign bauxite, 47 narrowing differential in power costs,48 and the recent
lems involved in entering the industry. SEN. Doc. No. 67, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-6 (1926).
For an explanation of Henry Ford's failure in his attempt to enter the aluminum industry,
see Londen & Collins, The Aluminum Industry, 8 HARv. Bus. REv. 67, 76, (1929).
43. See note 42 supra.
44. "Explanation of the hesitancy of independent enterprise to enter this field must be
found in a distaste for dependence upon monopoly for ingot supply, and the power of the
integrated monopoly over the ingot-sheet price differential." WALLACE, op. cit. supra
note 30, at 375.
45. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F.Supp. 333, 392-5 (S.D. N.Y.
1950). For summary of production by countries throughout the world, see TARIFF CoM-
MISSION REPoRT No. 14, supra note 47, at 6.
46. The history of the effect of tariffs on the aluminum industry is summarized in TAR-
IFF CoMMIssIor REPORT No. 14, supra note 47, at 105-8. The downward trend in tariffs of
recent years now shows signs of reversal. Press statement No. 18 of Rep. E. Celler (Dem.
N.Y.), Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, may be the forerunner of a re-emerg-
ing protectionist attitude toward the domestic aluminum industry. He said, on Oct. 23,
1950, that government stock-piling should be aimed at "utilization of the long term produc-
tion potential of the domestic aluminum industry." See also statement by Secretary of
Commerce Sawyer that aluminum stock-piles are to be built up primarily by expanding
domestic production, Wall St. Journal, Oct. 23, 1950, p. 3, col. 1. Following this policy,
the Government through the National Production Authority recently turned down "all,
or part, of Canada's offer to sell up to 440,000,000 pounds to the United States for its stock-
pile." This offer was refused in spite of the "35% cut in civilian use which is expected."
N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1950, § 3, p. 1, col. 8.
The 1950 court's opinion as to Aluminium's competitive effectiveness was predicated
on no rise in the tariff. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333, 394
(S.D. N.Y. 1950). With the present tariff, Aluminium's cost per lb. of ingot is 10.21c, while
Alcoa's costs range in the area of 10.66c per lb. Id. at 375. Thus even a slight cost rise for
Aluminium would seriously weaken its competitive strength in the United States market.
47. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333, 393 (S.D. N.Y. 1950).
Part of Aluminium's reserves are concentrated in Africa, the rest in South America. For
some idea of the bauxite transport difficulties that arose during the last war, see TARuFF
COMMISSION REPORT No. 14, op. cit. supra note 37, at 61.
48. The three American producers pay about one-fifth of their total "mill cost per ingot
ton" for electric power. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333, Table
VII (S.D. N.Y. 1950). Alcoa's electric cost per unit output is about 10% lower than Reyn-
olds and Kaiser. ITd. at 375.
The differentials which now exist between American and Canadian power costs, due
to cheap Canadian power supply, are being narrowed by such American federal power
projects as the TVA, which now supplies one of Alcoa's biggest ingot production plants. See
TROXEL, ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES ch. 34 (1947). If the modification of federal power
contracts referred to in note 41 supra were adopted, similar low cost advantages might be
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unpegging of the Canadian dollar. 49 Thus independent fabricators would
have to rely on Alcoa, Reynolds, or Kaiser for ingot. For the past three
years, Alcoa has supplied an average of 85% of the ingot consumed by the
independents." As the court pointed out, there is little reason to expect that
Reynolds and Kaiser will attempt of their own volition to increase their rela-
tivelyinsignificant contribution to theindependent market. 51 Boththese com-
panies have twice as much fabricating capacity as ingot production.12 They
-would therefore hesitate to increase their already heavy fixed cost of unused
.and undepreciated fabricating equipment by diverting ingot which would
leave more fabricating machines idle. 53 The only time Reynolds and Kaiser
have attempted to increase theiringot sales to these "second-class" customers
was during the 1949 break in the fabricated market"--a break not likely to
recur in the foreseeable future. The ardor of potential ingot competition
is further dampened by the fact that Reynolds and Kaiser would benefit
almost as much as Alcoa from the independent fabricators' being squeezed
out.56
The probable ineffectiveness of competition-either from Reynolds and
extended to smaller producers. Furthermore, adoption of lower public power rates may be
forthcoming when the federal government's projected 300% increase in the public power
supply is completed sometime within the next ten years. See POWER PROJECT RESPON-
SIBILITIES OF TEE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR (Dep't of Interior, Oct. 1, 1950). For an es-
timate of the undeveloped public power potential in the United States, see Hearings,
Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on A National Resources Policy, 81st Cong.
1st Sess. 245 (1949).
49. On September 30, 1950, the Canadian dollar was freed from the official exchange
rate. For an analysis of the background and implications of this move, see CANADIAN
STATISTICAL REviEw IV-VIII (Oct. 1950). The price of an American dollar dropped from
$1.10 to $1.05 in Canadian dollars. Id. at IV. Prior to Sept. 30, 1950, a Canadian manufac-
turer doing business in the United States could take each ten American dollars he received
for his product back to Canada and get eleven Canadian dollars. After September 30, 1950,
the same American ten dollars would bring him only $10.50 in Canadian money. This
currency move will make it more difficult for any Canadian producer to compete in the
American market.
50. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333, Table III at 356 (S.D.
N.Y. 1950). During the same three years, Reynolds supplied an average of about 11%,
and Kaiser an average of about 3y2a%. Ibid.
51. Ibid. A recent Government agreement with Kaiser, however, will require allocation
of part of the production of a proposed new aluminum plant to "other," presumably in-
dependent, fabricators. N.Y. Times, January 26,1951, p. 1, col. 4; p. 12, col. 4.
52. See note 39 supra.
53. Id. at 356. The Government maintained that "Reynolds and Kaiser had to
emphasize fabrication . . . to keep their overhead costs at fabricating plants down."
Government Brief 108.
54. With the first signs of a "buyer's market" in consumer's goods in 1949, Reynolds
and Kaiser attempted to compete in this non-integrated market for ingot. United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333, 356 (S.D. N.Y. 1950). For evidence of the
difficulties they encountered as "intermittent sellers," see Transcript of Record, Govt.
Exhibit 67, 81A, and p. 828, 1464.
55. These two producers would not benefit quite as much as Alcoa from the elimina-
tion of the independents. Reynolds' and Kaiser's only serious fabricating competition comes
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Kaiser or from Alted-may leave the non-integrated market to Alcoa
by default. Independent fabricators are the only competitors Alcoa has in
the field of kitchen utensils and other specialty items." Often in the past
Alcoa has yielded to temptation; its dominant position as an ingot supplier
has been used to hamper its non-integrated competitors selling fabricated
goods.57 Alcoa still has the power to discriminate against these competitors
today.5 And its power to do so will continue so long as it is integrated and
so long as it remains the dominant supplier of the independent fabricators.
from Alcoa, see note 57 infra. Alcoa, on the other hand, in many fabricating fields has no
competition besides the independents.
56. The fields in which Alcoa has only independent fabricating competition are shown
by the following summary of the types of fabrication capacity possessed by each of the
three integrated producers:
1948
PERCENTAGE OF EACH COMPANY'S FABRICATING CAPACITY
Alcoa Reynolds Kaiser
Sheet 50 65 56
Extrusion and Tubing 15 12





Powder and Paste X 2
100 100 100
See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America 91 F. Supp. 333, 372-4 (S.D. N.Y.
1950). In starred markets Alcoa has only non-integrated fabricating competition. It should
be noted that fabrication is not always a one-stage process itself. The utensils above,
for example, require a second stage of fabrication processing after the sheet manufacture.
57. Alcoa's restrictive practices are summarized, together with the attacks both
private and governmental made on them, in Reuschlein, Aluminum and Monopoly: A Phase
of an Unsolved Problem, 87 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 509, 535-7, and n. 127 (1939). The process of
restriction is further detailed in WALLACE, op. cit. supra note 30, at 367-408. He examines
in particular the effect of Alcoa's retrictive practices on the aluminum cooking utensils
industry. Id. at 408-442. Wallace concludes that the most effective means of securing com-
petition in the fabricating field would be to exclude ingot producers from later stages of
production. Id. at 487. This view is supported by another industry-wide study which con-
cluded that "in the long run, The Aluminum Co.'s fabricating subsidiaries can undersell
competition only by working on the profit margin that the parent Company derives from the
sale of ingots. For there is little reason for crediting Alcoa with fabricating costs signifi-
cantly lower than its competitors." The Aluminum Company of America, Fortune (Sept.
1934) 46, 102 et seg.
58. Alcoa has "that special power," in the non-integrated market, which accompanies
"disproportionate integration." A concern is "disproportionately integrated .. . [when
at one or more stages of production or distribution it acts as a supplier or customer for
enterprises with which it is in competition at other stages." EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note
18, at 98. "The policy of the law should be to . .. prevent the vertically integrated enter-
prise from controlling so much of the total supply at any stage . .. that adequate alter-
natives are unavailable to independent ex-terprises operating at preceding or subsequent
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This industrial pattern of market domination supported by integration
is far from unique.59 The courts have long realized that power in one market
is illegal when its effect is to restrict competition in a related market.60
Agreements binding railroads to buy all Pullman cars from one company
were outlawed as restricting entrance into the manufacturing field.6' Re-
quirement contracts binding taxi operators, in only a few cities, to purchase
cabs from one company were said to "effectively limit the outlets through
which cabs may be sold." 62 The major movie producer-distributors utilized
stages." Id. at 130. Cf. Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARv. L. REV. 27
(1949). Somewhat belated recognition of this problem by the Government is indicated by
Article VII of its contract with Kaiser, dated Feb. 2, 1951. There it is required that 25% of
"Kaiser's additional ingot production" be sold to independents.
59. The growth of vertical integration is analyzed in FTC, THE PRESENT TREND OF COR-
PORATE MERGERS AND AcquiSiTIoNs 12 (1947). The FTC figures suggest that 17% of post-
World War II mergers resulted in vertically integrated concerns. Id. at 11.
60. An early judicial skirmish with vertical integration occurred in United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). Tin foil producers and suppliers of licorice
for plug flavoring were divested because their acquisition was part of the attempt to mo-
nopolize tobacco production. Id. at 130. See Hale, supra note 38, at 923-4. See also United
States v. Corn Products Refining Company, 234 Fed. 964 (S.D. N.Y. 1916) (divestiture
of a candy factory bought by defendant syrup makers to force-under threat of competition
-other candy producers to buy syrup from them). Cf. United States v. International
Harvester Company, 214 Fed. 987 (D. Minn. 1914), appeal dismissed, 284 U.S. 587 (1918);
United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 226 Fed. 62 (W.D. N.Y. 1915).
Vertical integration got what looked like the stamp of official approval as a "facility
of industrial progress" in United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 442
(1920). But despite this seeming approbation, integration in some areas received less
favorable treatment. See Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 257 U.S. 129 (1921)
(upholding a state statute making it illegal for a manufacturer of cotton seed oil to operate
a cotton gin). The "commodities clause" forbade railroads to transport "any article or
commodity . . . manufactured, mined, or produced by them, . . . or which they own
in whole or in part . . ." 24 STAT. 379 (1887), as amended, 34 STAT. 584 (1906), 49 U.S.C.
§ 489 (1946). But see, United States v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 333 U.S. 771 (1948); United
States v. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co., 298 U.S. 492 (1936) (use of a holding company to circumvent
commodities clause upheld). The airlines have been similarly treated, 52 STAT. 1001 (1938),
49 U.S.C. § 489 (1946).
The influence of the Steel case has declined sharply in the past twenty years. Vertical
integration was successfully attacked in the meat-packing industry in United States v.
Swift and Co., 286 U.S. 106, 117 (1932). In the 1940's renewed attacks were launched against
vertical integration in various sectors of the nation's industry. See United States v. Klearflax
Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1945); United States v. General Motors Corp.,
121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941); notes 61-4 infra.
61. United States v. Pullman Co., 50 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1943). But Cf. United
States v. Pullman Co. et al., 64 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa. 1945).
62. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 226 (1947). Cf. United States v.
Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338, 339 (1949). For a similar situation, see United States v.
International Salt Co., 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947). See Note, 57 YALE L.J. 1298 (1948).
Market control violative of the Sherman Act is equally illegal whether maintained by ex-
clusive sale contracts and undue exercise of patent privileges or direct ownership through
integration.
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ownership over first-run exhibition outlets to restrain competition on the
exhibition level." This ownership was held to constitute in that context a
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, requiring complete divestiture."
In aluminum, integration excludes competitors from the ingot field "and
makes independent fabricators dependent on their principal competitor, Alcoa,
for ingot. Separation would encourage new entrants into both markets.
But this court entered the ring with its hands partially tied. This proceed-
ing was the remedial sequel to Alcoa's 1945 conviction; since Reynolds and
Kaiser were not sued as violators, they were not now before the court.66
Thus the court faced the task of establishing effective competition in alum-
inum, while having jurisdiction over only half the industry. This task was
made doubly difficult by Government surplus disposal which set up Rey-
nolds and Kaiser with integrated ingot and production facilities.
Nevertheless the court was not so helpless as it appeared to be; it could
have separated Alcoa's fabricating plants from its ingot production. This
one move would have greatly increased the sales outlets open to any po-
tential ingot producer.67 It would also eliminate competition by sufferance
in the fabricated market. New fabricators would no longer be dependent on
their strongest competitor for their ingot supply.,,
Separation of Alcoa's ingot production from its fabrication plants would
minimize Alcoa's incentive not to sell ingot to independent fabricators. 9
But barring a radical change in Aluminium's position and policies, Alcoa
would still be the only effective ingot supplier to this non-integrated market.
Alcoa's control over ingot price in the independent market would be as
63. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 166-9 (1948).
"Entry into the [producing] industry will be impossibly handicapped and not really
competitive so long as the existing majors continue to own or to control access to the best
theatres." Rostow, supra note 37, at 599. See also EvANs, BERTRAND & BLANCHARD, Tn
MOTION PIcTURE INDUSTRY-A PATTERN OF CONTROL 5, 13, 55 (TNEC Monograph 43,
1941); Note, Enforced Independence for Motion Picture Exhibitors, 48 YALE L.J. 339, 345
(1938).
64. Ibid.; United States v. Paramount Pictures, 85 F. Supp. 881, 893 (S.D. N.Y. 1949).
65. See pages 301-303 supra.
66. Reynolds and Kaiser became factors in aluminum production only after they bought
the government surplus plants after 1945. For a brief summary of the history of both com-
panies in the industry, see Brief of the Aluminum Co. of America 16-22.
67. For the past three years, the independent fabricators have consumed an average
of 218,000,000 lbs. of ingot annually. See note 31 supra. This is the only market in which a
new ingot producer could presently compete. Alcoa's fabricating facilities, even though half
of them are idle, consume 700,000,000 lbs. annually. By untying Alcoa's ingot plants from
fabrication units, sales outlets presently consuming over 900,000,000 lbs. of ingot would be
made available, for which Alcoa and any new producer might compete. Thus a new producer
would have available to him potential sales outlets over four times as great as at present.
See, however, notes 51 and 58 supra.
68. See note 57 supra.
69. Alcoa no longer would stand to gain an estimated $5,000,000 per year by selling
to their own rather than independent fabricators. See note 32 supra.
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complete as it is presently.70 This control over price, a traditional earmark
of monopoly power,7 ' could be weakened by reducing Alcoa's size in the in-
got market.7 2 Dissolution of Alcoa's ingot capacity into two competing units
would be the first move.
7 3
As the court predicted, increasing military need for aluminum will re-
quire expansion of productive capacity.7 4 Judicial analysis might have
guided emergency expansion as it did surplus disposal. 75
"Effective competition" at the ingot level would not emerge full blown
from mere dissolution of Alcoa into two producing units. One more ingot
producer would hardly change the basic market structure of oliogopoly.
7 1
The Government should stimulate new ingot capacity either by loaning
money to new independent producers, or by building new plants and dis-
posing of them to independents after the emergency. This would intro-
70. This market situation was described at the trial as competition "confined to rivalry
for orders." Transcript of Record 1443.
71. Sugar Institute Inc. et al. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553,601 (1936); United States
v. Trenton Potteries Inc., 273 U.S. 392, 396-7 (1927). See also United States v. General
Electric Co., 80 F. Supp. 989, 1015 (1948): "the total absence of price competition
[is a] sure [sign] of monopoly control . . ."
72. "Size of business units is the outstanding cause of departure from competition.
The first change required would be therefore a reduction in the size and an increase in the
number of firms." BuRNs, TaE DECLINE OF COMPETITION 525 (1936). For further analysis
of the relation between size in a market and monopoly power, see Rostow, The New Sherman
Act; A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 567, 589 (1947). Judicial
expression of the significance of size as an earmark of monopoly power is found in United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. Griffith,
334 U.S. 100, 107, n.10 (1948).
Alcoa's size in the market can be gauged by the standard of total assets. As of Dec.
31, 1948, Alcoa's assets were 4Y2 times those of Reynolds, and nearly 10Y2 times those of
Kaiser. Brief of the United States, Table 11 at 145. "Alcoa's asset position [comprising]
76% of the total assets of the aluminum industry, far exceeds the positions held by the
largest companies in the copper and steel industries." Id. at 146.
73. No more than two competitors could be set up because Alcoa presently owns only
two alumina plants. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333,
368 (S.D. N.Y. 1950). The Government plan contemplated compensating for the efficiency
discrepancy between these two plants by combining high cost reduction with low cost
alumina plants and vice versa.
Alcoa is now planning a new plant, to be located near Bauxite, Arkansas. Wall St.
Journal, January 22, 1951, p. 4, col. 2.
74. See statement issued by National Securities Resources Board, reprinted in Wall
St. Journal, Oct. 24, 1950, p. 2, col. 2, to the effect that reduction capacity is to be more than
doubled within the next 18 months. "Specifically under scrutiny were tentative plans for
increasing capacity of the existing firms." Id. col. 2.
75. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 446 (2d Cir. 1945). See
also Roback, Monopoly or Competition Through Surplus Plant Disposal? The Aluminum
Case, 31 CORN. L.Q. 302, 313-4 (1946) for analysis of the effect on surplus disposal of the
1945 court's mandate.
76. Oligopoly has been defined as that market condition "when there are just a few
rival sellers, [and] each seller takes into account the ways in which his rivals may respond to
any price policy he may pursue." BOWMAN & BACH, ECONOMIC ANALYsIS AND PUBLIC
POLICY, 303 (1946).
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duce a substantial number of new competitors to the ingot field. More-
over these new competitors need not be evanescent war-time phenomena;
competitive prices could tap the peacetime markets necessary to sustain
this production jumpy.
The court's inability to disintegrate Reynolds and Kaiser could be rem-
edied by a Government policy of no further aid for expansion of these in-
tegrated units.7 8 Thus a diminishing share of production and fabrication
would be tied together through integration.
This suggested competitive structure, involving separation of fabricators
from ingot producers and ingot production by a greater number of smaller
plants, would result in no loss of technological efficiency. Fabricating costs
of the nonintegrated fabricators are no higher than those of the integrated
fabricators. 9 And in regard to ingot production, the seductive equation of
plant size with economy of unit cost is disproved by comparison of ingot
cost figures. Costs per ingot ton bear no relation to the size of the three
producers' reduction plants.8M Any disadvantages of smaller research units
77. The results of a survey conducted by the University of Washington in cooperation
with the Department of Interior, reported in REPORT OF THE SuRPLus PROPERTY BOARD
To CONGRESS 39-40 (Sept. 21, 1945), indicate that lower prices could tap a potential alum-
inum market of almost double present capacity. It has been argued that dislike for reliance
on one company for supply, as well as the failure of price to respond to changes in cost and
demand, Brief of the United States at 96, has curbed increased use of aluminum. WALLACE,
op. cit. supra note 30, at 374-5. See also Note, The Aluminum Industry: An Anti-Trust
Experience, 37 COL. L. REv. 269, nn. 113-4 (1937).
78. Details of proposed low-interest loans and government subsidies to speed emergency
aluminum expansion are discussed in Wall St. Journal, Nov. 21, 1950, p. 7, col. 1, and Nov.
22, 1950, p. 2, col. 2. See note 51supra.
79. See The Aluminum Company of America, FORTUNE (Sept., 1934) 46, 102 et seg.; and
comparison of the costs of operating war-built fabrication plants, now operated by Reynolds
and Kaiser, with plants of independent fabricators, in REPORT OF THE SunR_.us PROPERTY
BOARD TO CONGRESS 59-74 (Sept. 21, 1945). Wallace agrees, by inference, that no substan-
tial cost differential prevails when he concludes that independent fabricators-if assured of
ingot--can continue to compete successfully with the integrated concerns. WALLACE,
op. cit. supra note 30, at 485.
Vertical integration has been termed a "catching fever"; if one enterprise engages in
it, its rivals are compelled to do so likewise. Hale, supra note 38, at 937. For analysis of the
higher costs of production resulting from such compulsory integration, see CHAMBERLIN,
TnE THmoRY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 123 (1938); MILLER, UNFAIR COMPETITION
213 (1941). These cost increases have been detailed in specific industries. "Less integrated
companies had a better record of efficiency in the farm machines industry, the automobile
industry, and the steel industry than larger and more highly integrated companies." RELA-
TIvE EFFICIENCY OF LARGE, MEDIUM-SIZED AND SMALL BUSINESS 93 (TNEC Monograph 13,
1941). On the basis of recent FTC studies of unit cost data in the baking, rubber tire, and
fertilizer industries, one expert concludes that "at the very least, the widely held assumption
that the ownership and control of plural production units by single corporate enterprise units
contributes to efficiency would seem to rest upon an overwhelming absence of supporting
facts." Blair, Technology and Size, 38 AM. ECON. REV. 121, 126 (1948).
80. See REPORT OF THE SURpLUS PROPERTY BOARD TO THE CONGRESS (Sept. 21, 1945).
Compare Appendix 13(c) at 93, Annual Capacity of Reduction Plants, with Appendix 15(c)
at 117, Representative Costs and Possible Post-War Production Costs at the Mill of Pig Alum-
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might be surmounted by industry-supported research, as in the oil industry,
or by independent research firms.8 '
The consumer would benefit substantially from separation and dissolution.
Competitive ingot prices would encourage the development of new uses for
aluminum.12 Also lower transport costs would be made possible by separa-
tion of ingot production from fabrication. Fabrication plants nearest ingot
supplies and consumer markets could be fully utilized. Such optimum use
is precluded now becauserfabricators closest to one ingot producer sometimes
belong to another integrated producer located further away.83
Failure to analyze the effects of vertical integration thus dims the hope
for effective competition in aluminum. This court did less than it might
have; but even if it had done what the Government requested and created a
new vertically integrated competitor, new entry would still be virtually im-
possible.
On the other hand, the court's new remedial test adds a potentially useful
weapon to the antitrust arsenal. By emphasizing the prevention of future
dominance-rather than the destruction of present monopoly-the court in
effect divorced the remedy from the violation. Future courts may apply
this remedial standard to reshape entire industries and thus avoid the now
familiar antitrust cycle of one violation springing from the roots of another
just condemned.
inum. These plants were all built at about the same time, and there is no correlation be-
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82. Under the shadow of the antitrust proceeding, post-war aluminum prices have
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83. Reynolds owns reduction plants located in Alabama, Arkansas, Oregon, and the
State of Washington. Most of its fabrication capacity, on the other hand, is located in
Illinois and Michigan. Thus ingot must be shipped a considerable distance from one of
Reynolds' ingot plants to its fabrication facilities. Alcoa has reduction plants located in
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91 F. Supp. 333, 365-374 (S.D. N.Y. 1950). For maps showing location of each producer's
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[Vol. 60: 294
